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APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES ANTITRUST
LAWS TO FOREIGN TRADE AND COMMERCE-
VARIATIONS ON AMERICAN BANANA
SINCE 1909*
EARL W. KINTNER** AND KATHERINE DREW HALLGARTEN***
The continued growth of American investment abroad which
commenced after World War II, the accompanying expansion of
foreign investment in the United States, and the uncertain interna-
tional trade picture which has developed in the 1970's make timely
an assessment of the extent of the application of the Sherman Act'
and other antitrust laws 2 to the trade and commerce of the United
States with foreign nations. 3
In volume and types of foreign investment in either direction,
and in volume and complexity of litigation, we have come a long
way from the simpler setting of the 1909 American Banana Co. v.
* This article is based upon research material which will appear in part as a chapter in
An International Antitrust Primer, to be published in 1974 by the Macmillan Company, New
York, N.Y., under the co-authorship of Earl W. Kintner and Mark R. Joelson.
** A.B., DePauw University, 1936; J.D., Indiana University, 1938; Chairman, Federal
Trade Commission, 1959-61; Member, Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn, Washington,
D. C.
*** A.B., Stanford University, 1930; J.D., University of California Law School (Ber-
keley), 1937; Member, Council of the Section of International Law of the American Bar
Association; President, Washington Foreign Law Society; Consultant, Arent, Fox, Kintner,
Plotkin & Kahn.
1 15 U.S.C, §§ 1-7 (1970). 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) provides in relevant part: "Every contract
combination in the form of trust of otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
. . . with foreign nations . . ." is illegal. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970) makes it a crime for a "person
... [to] monopolize or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person
or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce . with foreign nations . . . ."
2 The Wilson Tariff Act of 1894, §§ 73-77, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1970), one of the other
antitrust laws, is a less comprehensive statute than the Sherman Act. It is often applied in
antitrust cases in combination with the Sherman Act. It has been said that the statute makes
explicit the prohibitions of the Sherman Act in the field of foreign commerce. United States v.
General Elec. Co., 80 F. Supp. 989, 1017 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). The Wilson Tariff Act is directed
specifically at abuses of the import laws of the United States, but it is well settled that both
Acts can be applied to restraints on import trade. United States v. R.P. Oldham Co., 152 F.
Supp. 818, 821 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
Under § 73 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 8 (1970), every combination conspiracy, trust,
agreement, or contract made by or between two or more persons importing any article from
any foreign country is illegal if "intended to operate in restraint of lawful trade, or free
competition in lawful trade or commerce" or to increase the market price in any part of the
United States of any article imported into the United States or of any manufacture into which
such imported article enters. Criminal sanctions apply to violations.
3 The value of American direct investments abroad totaled $86.0 billion at year-end
1971, up $7.8 billion from year-end 1970. 52 Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, Survey of Current Business 21 (1972)..The value of foreign direct investments in
the United States increased from $7.4 billion at year-end 1961 to $13.7 billion at year-end
1971. 53 Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Survey of Current Business
29 (1973).
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United Fruit Co. case. 4 Nevertheless, the holding in American
Banana that the Act of State doctrine bars a claim for antitrust injury
flowing from foreign sovereign acts allegedly induced and procured
by the defendant, was relied on as recently as 1971 as the basis for
dismissing a complaint in a treble damage suit involving facts which
the court found "strikingly similar" to those - in American Bananas
Justice Holmes used language in American Banana which, being
regarded as expressing the restrictive territorial view of subject
matter jurisdiction under the Sherman Act, has cast its shadow over
later cases.
As our "trade or commerce with foreign nations" has become
larger in volume, and more complicated in relationships, the courts,
in case after case, have, however, found facts additional to those in
American Banana so that a wider scope could be given to the
extraterritorial reach of our antitrust laws, without forthrightly dis-
agreeing with the restrictive view expressed in American Banana.
In brief, it can now be said that as far as subject matter
jurisdiction is concerned, 6 "the Sherman Act covers restrictive or
monopolistic activity which either occurs 'in' the course of American
domestic, or export or import commerce, or which 'affects' such
commerce," and that "[t]he Act applies regardless of where the
restrictive conduct occurs, even if it is entirely abroad, provided the
necessary relation to U.S. commerce is present." Those essential
"effects are not by any means always present . . . and it is necessary
to analyze each case on its particular facts to see whether American
Law could reach" such case.?
Given this necessity to analyze each case on its particular facts,
there are certain factors that have recurred in cases throughout the
years that provide us with "guidelines" as to what circumstances
may be found to have the requisite effect. At this juncture, it is
possible to group cases in certain categories.
This article will attempt, by grouping cases into rough
categories, to provide an overview of how far we have gone from
the restrictive territorial view expressed in American Banana, and to
raise the question, perhaps not yet answerable: has the United States
213 U.S. 347 (1909). See text at notes 14-18 infra.
3 See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal.
1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972), discussed in text at
notes 70-72 infra.
6 Throughout this article it will be assumed that there is jurisdiction over the person, and
the discussion will be confined to jurisdiction over the subject matter.
7 Rahl, Relationship of U.S. to EEC Antitrust Law, in Current Legal Aspects of Doing
Business in Europe 82 (L. Theberge ed. 1971). See also Beausang, The Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction of the Sherman Act, 70 Dick. L. Rev. 187, 191 (1966): "An 'affect' is a necessary
element of [subject matter] jurisdiction . . . ; a direct and substantial 'affect' is necessary for
Sherman Act violations."
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arrived at the point of ultimate reach of its laws, from the strict legal
viewpoint, as well as from the standpoint of "what is good" for
its "foreign trade or commerce"?
I. FOREIGN TRADE OR COMMERCE TO WHICH THE
SHERMAN ACT S APPLIES
In general terms, "trade or commerce with foreign nations"
consists of the export from the United States or the import into this
country of goods, and of transportation to or from United States
ports. But such commerce may extend even farther—it may consist of
certain services—since the Constitution authorizes the Congress to
"regulate commerce with foreign nations."9
 When United States
vessels are used in trade between foreign ports of goods owned and
shipped by foreigners, a service—transportation in United States
vessels—is being sold, and that is also "commerce" in the sense of
the .Constitution and of the Sherman Act."
By its very nature, foreign commerce inevitably involves acts
abroad, as well as acts at home. It may also encompass acts of
United States citizens in foreign countries as well as at home, and
acts of aliens in this country, as well as in their own and other
countries. It is now settled law that the Sherman Act was intended
to apply even to acts of aliens in foreign countries" in certain
circumstances. But the Act applies to the activities of none of the
"persons" here described, no matter where their activities in foreign
commerce take place, unless those activities actually restrain trade,
or have an anti-competitive effect on United States trade or com-
merce. Since most of the antitrust cases with foreign commerce
aspects have arisen under the Sherman Act, the focus of this article
is predetermined, but incidental mention will be made of other
antitrust laws.
Although Congress intended that the Sherman Act should have
such an indicated broad sweep in foreign commerce, an added
factor, the comity between nations under public international law,
places certain practical limitations on the reach of United States
law.' 2
 Where activities in foreign commerce appear to violate
8 is U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
9 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 9 Wheat. 362 (1824).
I° See Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir.
1968), cert denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969).
" See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), where
jurisdiction was asserted over a Canadian corpOration for a conspiracy hatched in Canada.
See text at notes 28-35 infra.
12 See the statement by Justice Holmes in American Banana, discussed in text at notes
14-17 infra, that it would be "an interference with the authority of another sovereign, contrary
to the comity of nations" for another jurisdiction to apply it own laws to acts done outside its
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United States laws, consideration is given also to foreign policy and
economic consequences" by the courts in fashioning decrees. We
shall first discuss the varying situations in which the Sherman Act
has or has not been found applicable in cases involving foreign trade
'or commerce, and then examine the extent to which economic and
international political considerations affect enforcement.
II. EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF UNITED STATES
ANTITRUST LAWS TO ACTS
DONE ABROAD
A. By United States Citizens
There are limits under international law to the extraterritorial
reach of a nation's law even where acts of its own citizens are
involved. The first Supreme Court case involving the extraterritorial
reach of United States antitrust laws is generally regarded as the
classic example of a factual situation which is outside the reach of
our antitrust laws. In that treble damage suit under what was then
section 7 of the Sherman Act, 14 American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 15
 both parties were United States corporations. The acts
complained of took place in territory over which Costa Rica claimed
sovereignty. While the main facts of the case are almost too well-
known to bear repetition, their recital in successive cases has been
streamlined to the point that some details which help to distinguish
American Banana from those later cases have been lost sight of.
One important detail which should not be lost sight of is that
plaintiff, American Banana Co., had never engaged in the banana
export business, but had merely acquired, shortly before bringing
suit, a plantation and railroad concession in an area where defen-
dant, United Fruit, was already well established. On the other
hand, defendant had, over a period of years, built up, through
various predatory acts, an almost exclusive monopoly of the banana
export trade between Central and South America and the United
States.
The only damages claimed in the complaint were (1) for injury
to plaintiff's plantation, business and railroad, inflicted by the Costa
jurisdiction. Such considerations, Justice Holmes said, "would lead, in case of doubt, to a
construction of any statute as intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the
territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power." 213 U.S. at 356.
See the much more recent case, Occidental Petroleum, discussed in text at notes 70-72 infra.
13
 See United States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1951), discussed in
text at notes 73-83 infra; United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, Inc.,
1965 Trade Cas. ¶ 71,352, at 80,490 (S.D.N. Y. 1965), discussed in text at notes 107-10 infra.
t4 Currently 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
t 5
 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
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Rican government which, allegedly at defendant's instigation, had
seized plaintiffs property shortly after plaintiff had acquired it, and
(2) for injury resulting from the securing of control by defendant and
its associates of the banana market. 16
Since plaintiff had never engaged in the banana export trade,
and had not made extensive preparations to do so, the allegations of
injury to plaintiff resulting from defendant's acts in securing control
of the trade, standing alone, were found to be too indefinite and
uncertain to state a cause of action." Thus, it remained for plaintiff
to prove that defendant violated the Sherman Act by persuading the
Costa Rican government to seize plaintiffs property. The Court
declared it impossible to make such a finding, stating:
[I]t is a contradiction in terms to say that within its juris-
diction it is unlawful to persuade a sovereign power to
bring about a result that it declares by its conduct to be
desirable and proper. It does not, and foreign courts can-
not, admit that the influences were improper or the results
bad. It [the sovereign] makes the persuasion lawful by its
own act.' 8
In other words, the actions plaintiff alleged caused it injury, though
influenced by defendant, were committed by a foreign sovereign,
whose acts within its own jurisdiction are lawful by definition.
B. By United States Citizens and Aliens
It would be a mistake to read American Banana as declaring
that the mere fact that acts are done abroad makes the Sherman Act
inapplicable, as a careful reading of that case and a close reading of
section 1 of the Act demonstrate.
It appears that the Court in American Banana took the view
that Congress did not intend the Sherman Act to apply to acts
performed outside the United States. But there is language indicat-
ing that any statements giving that impression were intended to be
limited to the facts of this particular case. After stating that "all
legislation is prima facie territorial," Justice Holmes later states:
"We think it entirely plain that what the defendant did in Panama
or Costa Rica is not within the scope of the statute so far as the
present suit is concerned."" He then upheld dismissal of the com-
14
 See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 166 F. 261, 264 (2d Cir. 1908).
17
 Id. While, as the court pointed out, in order to state a cause of action for damages
under the Sherman Act, it is not necessary to aver an injury to an existing business, it is
necessary in such a case to state facts showing an intention and a preparedness to engage in
business.
19
 213 U.S. at 358.
19 Id. at 357 (emphasis added).
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plaint on the ground that defendant's acts in Costa Rica had not
violated the Sherman Act, but he did not expressly reach the ques-
tion of an effect on United States commerce. As the development of
the law in later cases has shown, the thrust of section 1 of the
Sherman Act is that acts in "restraint of trade or commerce . . . with
foreign nations" are unlawful.
C. Kinds of Acts Having an Effect
The key factor in the determination of Sherman Act jurisdiction
of a combination or contract made in a foreign country and effec-
tuated in the United States is whether it adversely affects the foreign
commerce of the United States. This principle is illustrated by
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 2° in which a number of
American and two English corporations engaged in the tobacco
trade were held to have restrained United States foreign trade and to
have created a monopoly in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act. 21 The agreements between the English and American
companies, which were made in England, divided up world markets
in the tobacco trade. Imperial, one of the English companies, agreed
to limit its business to the United Kingdom, and the other English
company, British-American Tobacco, was also involved in the trade
restrictions. The Court stated that by these contracts the two En-
glish corporations became co-operators in the combination which
constituted an unlawful restraint of trade under sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act. 22 The Court regarded the effect on United States
trade as the decisive factor for the application of the Sherman Act in
a situation where the acts in question were committed outside the
United States. In Thomsen v. Cayser, 23 the Supreme Court expressly
based its findings of a violation of the Sherman Act, by foreign
shipowners and their American agents who had combined to re-
strain trade, on the ground that the combination formed in a foreign
country and put into operation in the United States affected United
States trade.
D. Legal Basis of Application of United States
Laws to Aliens
In American Tobacco and Cayser, alien defendants were af-
fected by the decisions. The issue arises of the applicability of the
2° 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
2 ' 15 U.S.C. H 1, 2 (1970).
22 221 U.S. at 182-83.
23 243 U.S. 66 (1917). Under subsequent legislation, the Maritime Commission now has
power, under certain circumstances, to immunize such groups of carriers from antitrust suits.
Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1970).
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antitrust laws to acts of aliens. It was not actually discussed in those
cases, but it may be asked: Did Congress intend to attach liability to
acts of aliens committed beyond the borders of the United States? Is
the imposition of such liability upon aliens compatible with princi-
ples of international law? 24 General words such as those in the
Sherman Act must not be interpreted so as to conflict with principles
of international law. Congress did not intend to "punish all whom
its courts can catch, for conduct which has no consequences within
the United States." 25
The "consequences," i.e., the effect on United States foreign
commerce, is the criterion of liability of aliens under the antitrust
laws, even if the activities take place abroad. It is now "settled law
that . . any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not
within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has conse-
quences within ... its borders which" that nation declares illegal. 26
This classic statement defining the extent to which the antitrust laws
may be applied to actions committed abroad expresses the objective
territorial principle of modern international law, as distinguished
from the limited territorial principle expounded in American
Banana. 27
In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 28 the
court held that it was the intent of Congress to apply the antitrust
laws to acts of aliens abroad under certain circumstances. In this
case, the Government alleged that Alcoa, an American corporation,
24 "International law" is defined as "the rules that determine the rights and obligations of
states and international organizations." Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States § 1, comment a (1965).
The recognized customs prevailing between states . . . are reflected not only in
international practice per se but also in international treaties and agreements, in the
general principles of law recognized by states, in judicial and arbitral decision, and
in the works of qualified scholars.
1 M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law § I, at 1 (1963).
25 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) (Alcoa).
Alcoa is cited in Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 18,
reporters' note 2. Section 18 itself provides in pertinent part:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to
conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory, if .
(b)(i) the conduct and its effects are constituent elements of activity to which the rule
applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and
foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is not
inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recognized by states that have
legally developed legal systems,
For comment on this provision, and a comparison of it with the guideline proposed on
this subject in Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws (1955), see ABA Antitrust Developments 1955-1968, at 46-49.
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
27 See Timberg, United States and Foreign Antitrust Laws Governing International
Business Transactions, in A Lawyer's Guide to International Business Transactions 623-24
(W. Surrey & C. Shaw ed. 1963).
" 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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and Aluminum Limited (Limited), a Canadian company, had con-
spired with foreign producers of ingots to restrain interstate and
foreign commerce of the United States in violation of the Sherman
Act, by entering into restrictive cartel agreements made abroad.
Quotas were imposed on imports of ingots into the United States. 29
The court found that Limited had joined in the cartel arrange-
ment with the other foreign companies, and reversed the trial court's
finding that no Sherman Act violation had occurred. 3° The court
reasoned that the cartel agreement would clearly have been unlaw-
ful if it had been made in the United States, and that such an
agreement would be unlawful, although made abroad, if it was
intended to affect, and in fact did affect, imports into the United
States. The court found that since the parties to the cartel had
expected that the agreed restriction upon production would have an
effect upon imports into the United States, the requisite intent was
present."
E. Aliens as Co-conspirators and Defendants
In Alcoa, an alien member of the conspiracy, Limited, was
before the court as a defendant. In some cases, the facts describe
both American and foreign conspirators, while only the Americans
have been made defendants. Since it is necessary to consider the acts
of the co-conspirators in order to prove the conspiracy, it has been
argued that if the alien corporate co-conspirators are not before the
court as defendants, the court does not have jurisdiction to consider
their conduct abroad relating to the commerce of foreign nations. 32
This was argued by American corporate defendants in United States
v. National Lead Co., 33
 in which the Government sought to enjoin
the alleged unlawful division of the world into exclusive trade areas
to suppress all competition in the titanium trade by the defendants
and alien co-conspirators.
The court responded to the argument that it lacked jurisdiction
by stating that the activities of the foreign conspirators could not be
29
 Id. at 442.
3°
 Id. at 443-45.
31 Id. at 444.
" The failure in the earlier cases to bring foreign conspirators before the courts as de-
fendants was often due to the difficulty of serving them with process. This problem has been
considerably eased in civil actions due to the promulgation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i), which
embodied the recommendations on service of process abroad made by the Commission on
International Rules of Judicial Procedure in 1963. See Fourth Annual Report, H.R. Doc. No.
88, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). For a recent example of the successful application of Rule
4(i), see Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo S.p.A., 244 F. Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
33
 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
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isolated. These activities were all integral parts of one conspiracy to
restrain world commerce, which included the foreign commerce of
the United States, and thus were within the jurisdictional reach of
the Sherman Act.
Unquestionably, if the gravamen of the complaint were to
impeach the Aussig [Czechoslovakian] agreement as such,
or the BPT-Laporte [Canadian] quota arrangement as
such, the point would be well taken. But that is not the
gist of the complaint. On the contrary, it has been alleged
and proved that a conspiracy was entered into, in the
United States, to restrain and control the commerce of the
world, including the foreign commerce of the United
States. The several agreements relating to manufacture
and trade within the European markets are but some of the
links in the chain which was designed to enthrall the entire
commerce in titanium. 34
The court issued an injunction and ordered cancellation of the
agreements between the three American defendants and the foreign
corporate co-conspirators. 35
HI. APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAWS
TO ACTS OF ALIENS OR CITIZENS WHOLLY OR IN PART
IN THE UNITED STATES AFFECTING FOREIGN TRADE
OR COMMERCE
In United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 36 violation of both the
Sherman Act and the Wilson Tariff Act was charged by the Gov-
ernment in a bill to enjoin an alleged combination by several Ameri-
can corporations, one Mexican corporation, and certain individuals
to secure a monopoly on the importation and sale of sisal" in the
United States. The monopoly had been created in a series of ar-
rangements by defendants entered into in the United States. Defen-
dants had also arranged in Mexico to make one of them exclusive
selling agent for the official Mexican agency which was the sole
buyer of sisal from Mexican producers. Defendants had exerted
influence to obtain passage by the Mexican and Yucatan govern-
ments of discriminatory laws favorable to the conspiracy. These
14 63 F. Supp. at 524-25.
35 Id. at 532-35. The order was affirmed with minor modifications by the Supreme
Court, which stated that the decree was of "commendable fairness having especial regard to
the needs of the case." 332 U.S. at 335.
36 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
37 Sisal is a kind of hemp fiber used in making twine.
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steps led to the destruction of all competition in the sisal trade in the
United States. 38
The trial court dismissed the case, regarding American Banana
as controlling. 39
 The Supreme Court reversed, finding the circum-
stances in Sisal "radically different" from those in American
Banana, where all the relevant actions took place abroad." In
Sisal, the contract and conspiracy were entered into in the United
States, and made effective 6y acts committed in this country. The
Court pointed out that in this case, the United States complained of
a violation of its laws, committed within its own territory by parties
subject to its jurisdiction, and not of actions carried out by another
government at the instigation of private parties as in American
Banana. It was true, the Court noted, that the parties were aided in
their scheme by Mexican legislation; however, it was by their own
deliberate acts "here and elsewhere [that] they brought about for-
bidden results within the United States,"41 under the Sherman Act
and the Wilson Tariff Act. While in Sisal the action by the Mexican
government was but one incident of a larger scheme of restriction of
trade by the defendants, in American Banana the action by the
Costa Rican government was the sole action which comprised the
alleged Sherman Act violation. 42
IV. DEFENSES RAISED BY DEFENDANTS IN
EXTRATERRITORIAL ANTITRUST SUITS
The decisions in Alcoa, and in the cases that immediately
followed," firmly established that it is "settled law" that liability
under United States antitrust laws may be imposed upon persons,
including aliens, for activities carried on wholly or partially abroad,
provided their transactions and activities were intended to affect
imports and did affect them. In each successive case there is
nevertheless the problem of determining the precise applicability of
this principle to the varying factual situations. Over a period of
39 274 U.S. at 273.
29 Id. at 268. The district court opinion was unreported.
49 Id. at 275.
A' Id. at 276.
42 The situs of the actions which are said to violate the antitrust laws is not the decisive
factor in determining jurisdiction. Whether acts take place in the United States or abroad, the
main question is their effect on United States trade. Thus, in 1955, a court relied on Sisal in
awarding treble damages to a plaintiff where the acts effectuating the conspiracy took place
partly inside and partly outside the United States. Sanib Corp. v. United Fruit Co., 135 F.
Supp. 764, 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1955),
43 See, e.g., United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio
1949), aff'd as modified, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp.
753 (D.N.J. 1949); United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945),
aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
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years the courts in their decisions have woven a tapestry whose
subtle shadings have been determined by the often ingenious argu-
ments advanced by defendants to demonstrate in what way their
conduct or characteristics and situations made this principle inap-
plicable to them. Furthermore, the courts have been faced with the
practical problem of determining to what extent, under international
law, their decrees affecting aliens could and should be enforced.
A. Intent to Affect United States Trade or Commerce
If as has been said, persons must have intended by their con-
duct abroad to affect United States trade or commerce before they
may be held liable for violating United States antitrust laws, it is
necessary to define "intent" in this context. It is not a specific intent
to violate the antitrust laws that is required." The intent that is
meant here is the intent to enter into an agreement, the natural
consequences of which would be to affect United States commerce.
Intent is found in the fact that the person who entered into the
agreement knew or should have known that the effect would natur-
ally follow from the performance of the agreement.
In United States v. General Electric Co., 45 one of the defen-
dants, a foreign corporation, N.V. Philips' Gloeilampenfabrieken
(Philips), defended on the ground that it lacked the necessary intent
for liability under the Sherman Act. In that case Philips and certain
American corporations, including General Electric Co., had entered
into patent licensing agreements containing territorial restrictions
and into worldwide cartel agreements in furtherance of General
Electric's incandescent lamp monopoly.
Philips had also complained that it had been "haled before the
court because of agreements it entered into in its native land which
were entirely legal there." Philips urged the adoption of a rule that
foreign corporations, which, like itself, are engaged in business
abroad, may enter into agreements among themselves or with
American corporations or with individuals "freely and without fear
of anti-trust suits [in the United States], so long as what they do is
not done wilfully to restrain United States trade and does not have a
direct and substantial effect upon it. "46
 Philips apparently believed
that since it was a foreign corporation, the jurisdiction of the Ameri-
can court was more tenuous over it than over an American corpora-
tion, and therefore a stricter standard of intent should be required
for it to be liable under the Sherman Act. The court was not
persuaded by such arguments. Philips was found in violation of the
44 United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N. J. 1949).
45 Id.
46
 Id. at 890.
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Act under the normal standard of intent. Philips had acted with the
requisite intent for violation of the Act in that it had lent itself to the
General Electric plan of stifling potential sources of foreign lamp
parts and in that it had known or should have known that the real
purpose of the licensing with territorial restraints was to keep
Philips out of the United States market. 47
B. Excuses for Conduct
Variants of the lack of wilful intent defense are arguments that
although the effect of the agreement was to restrain trade, the
conduct was excusable because it was "ancillary" to an allegedly
"legal main transaction," or that the action could be excused as
"reasonable" in light of conditions abroad which made profitable
- operations difficult. But again, such defenses are not acceptable if
the agreements do in fact restrain trade. Two types of "legal main
transactions" presented as a defense in an antitrust conspiracy case
involving an American corporate defendant and foreign co-
conspirators were an alleged "joint venture" and a "legitimate"
licensing of a trademark.
In this case, United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co.," the
defendant and the foreign co-conspirators, British Timken Ltd.
(British Timken) and Socike Anonyme Francaise Timken (French
Timken), were all in dominant positions, Timken in the world and
the co-conspirators in their respective countries, in the tapered roller
bearing industry.
At the time of the suit, the American company owned approxi-
mately a thirty percent financial interest in British Timken, and an
English businessman, Dewar, a twenty-four percent interest. In
1928 these two parties organized French Timken, owning all of its
stock. American Timken was under separate control from the other
two companies, so that American Timken and the other two com-
panies were potential competitors. From 1928 on, however, the
three Timken companies were parties to agreements which (1) allo-
cated trade territories among themselves, allocated use of the
trademark "Timken" to each of the parties in their respective ter-
ritories, and required that the co-conspirators not manufacture and
sell bearings except under the mark "Timken;" (2) fixed prices; (3)
provided for cooperation to protect each other's markets and to
eliminate outside competition; and (4) provided for participation in
cartels to restrict imports to and exports from the United States. 49
47 Id. at 891.
49 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949), aff'd as modified, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
49 83 F. Supp. at 287.
354
INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION OF AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAWS
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's rejection of the joint
venture defense, stating that "[Ole fact that there is common owner-
ship or control of the contracting corporations does not liberate them
from the impact of the antitrust laws." 50 The defendants were
legally separate corporations and persons and could not justify sup-
pression of competition by labeling their project a joint venture. In
theory, a joint venture is a single entity, and arguably it could not
violate the Sherman Act, which is addressed to a contract, combina-
tion or conspiracy, and thus necessarily involves two or more per-
sons. The trademark contracts were found to be subsidiary to the
central purpose of allocating trade territories, contrary to Timken's
contention that the restraints of trade were only incidental to them.
The defendants in Timken also argued that the steps taken by
the co-conspirators to eliminate competition among themselves in
England, France and the United States were reasonable in view of
foreign trade conditions such as tariffs and restrictive quotas which
made it impossible to conduct, in any other manner, a profitable
business in England, France and elsewhere. 5 ' This argument was
strenuously rejected by the Court, particularly in view of the finding
that, contrary to defendant's contention, competition was possible
and would have occurred had it not been for the restraints
imposed. 52
Defendants in United States v. Minnesota Mining & Manufac-
turing Co. 53 also argued unsuccessfully that agreements in restraint
of trade were reasonable because of foreign business conditions. 54 In
this case, a group of American manufacturers controlling eighty
percent of the export trade in coated abrasives combined to establish
jointly-owned factories in England, Canada and Germany. They
refrained from exportation of their products from the United States
to countries where the products of the foreign plants could be sold
more profitably than the American-made goods. 55 The trial court
agreed that if American trade was impossible because of lack of
profitability, then the restrictive actions would be legitimate "[nor
the very hypothesis is that there is not and could not be any
American foreign commerce in that area which could be restrained
or monopolized." 56 However, the defendants' argument here failed
because they did not allege impossibility of foreign trade without
restrictions, but merely that foreign trade would be inconvenient
5° 341 U.S. at 598.
51
 Id. at 599.
52 Id.
53 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
54
 Id. at 958.
55
 Id. at 959.
56 Id. at 958.
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and impractical, and a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act was
found."
1. Acts Acquiesced in or Compelled by a Foreign Government
In the early American Banana case" the ruling was that the
antitrust laws are not applicable in a treble damage suit to acts
lawful in a foreign country, committed in that country, and per-
formed or ordered by the foreign sovereign. In numerous cases after
American Banana the courts have found facts which relieved them
from the necessity of applying the strict territorial jurisdiction theory
propounded in that early case. There is also the ruling in Sisal59 that
the mere fact that a foreign government has been induced to pass
discriminatory laws which favor the maintenance of a monopoly in a
product imported into the United States from that country is no
defense to a charge of combining to monopolize such trade.
Going beyond Sisal, the fact, standing alone, that a person
whose acts in a foreign country are in restraint of United States
commerce is proceeding pursuant to a law of that foreign country
likewise does not make such acts legal under United States law. In
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. , 6° defendant
Canadian corporation, Electro Metallurgical Co. of Canada (Elec-
tro), argued that its acts were protected because they were per-
formed according to Canadian law. Electro acted as exclusive agent
under a regulation of the Canadian government which provided that
no vanadium products were to be purchased for use of Canadian
steel firms except through its exclusive agent. Acting under the
control and direction of its parent, Union Carbide, Electro refused
to purchase any vanadium from plaintiff Continental Ore, thus
barring plaintiff from the Canadian market. The actions by Electro
and Union Carbide were alleged by plaintiff to be restraints on trade
in violation of the Sherman Act.
The district court61 and court of appeals62 ruled in favor of
Electro on the ground it was acting as an agent of the Canadian
Government. The Supreme Court reversed. 63 Electro, in refraining
from buying from Continental Ore, was acting in a-manner permit-
ted by Canadian law. However, the Court found nothing to indicate
that such law in any way compelled discriminatory purchasing,
57 Id, at 961.
58 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
59 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
6° 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
61 The district court opinion was unreported.
62 289 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1961).
63 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
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stating that "it is well settled that acts which are in themselves legal
lose that character when they become constituent elements of an
unlawful scheme.""
2. Government Compulsion, Sovereign Immunity and Act
of State as Defenses
Even where, as a practical matter, a foreign government ap-
proves and lends support to private activities in its country which
affect United States trade, such approval cannot convert an essen-
tially private conspiracy into a system of governmental regulation
shielded from antitrust liability by the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity. In United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information
Center, Inc., 65 the defense of sovereign immunity was urged unsuc-
cessfully in such a situation. In that case, the United States alleged a
conspiracy between several Swiss and American companies and
trade associations, some of whom were named as defendants, and
some as co-conspirators only, to impose unreasonable restraints on
the foreign and domestic trade and commerce of the United States in
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 73 of the
Wilson Tariff Act.
The conspirators were manufacturers and sellers of Swiss
watches and watch parts, together with their trade associations. The
basis of the complaint was a private agreement called the "Collec-
tive Convention," executed in Switzerland, by Swiss organizations.
The Convention bound the Swiss signatories and their subsidiaries
in the United States. It was intended to protect the Swiss watch
industry from foreign inroads and was intended to, and did, restrict
unreasonably the manufacture of watches and watch parts in the
United States, and restrain United' States imports and exports of
watches and watch parts for both manufacturing and repair pur-
poses. Various other restrictive practices were charged. The Swiss
Government, indicating its approval of these private arrangements,
passed legislation in aid of the Convention signatories. For example,
any signatory who breached any of the Convention's provisions was,
under Swiss law, subject to private sanctions provided in the Con-
vention, and nonsignatories were subjected to certain price and
other regulations.
64 Id. at 707. See United States v. Learner. Co., 215 F. Supp. 603 (D. Hawaii 1963),
which relied on Sisal and Continental in refusing to dismiss an indictment under the Sherman
Act, where restrictive agreements by two American corporations with Japanese cartels were
legal under Japanese laws. The defendants argued that the indictment stated no offense,
apparently contending that acts committed in dealing with a foreign country are not illegal if
legal under the law of the foreign country.
65 1963 Trade Cas, ¶ 70,600, at 77,414 (S.D,N,Y. 1962).
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Defendants claimed that the court should not assume jurisdic-
tion over their activities because American antitrust laws cannot be
applied to acts of sovereign governments. They apparently based
this defense on the fact that the agreements were entered into and
became effective in. Switzerland, and were sanctioned by Swiss law. 66
In rejecting defendants' claim of lack of jurisdiction, the court stated
that the defendants' activities were not required by Swiss law. They
were agreements formulated privately without compulsion on the
part of the Swiss Government. The court reasoned that although
those agreements were "recognized as facts of economic and indus-
trial life by that nation's government," that form of governmental
action did not convert them into agreements required by that foreign
country's law.
If, on the other hand, a foreign government actually compels a
person to act as he does, and such act might otherwise violate
United States antitrust laws, such compulsion is a complete defense
to an antitrust case based on the act compelled. Furthermore, the
"Act of State" doctrine prevents the court from inquiring into the
validity of the law of the foreign state under which the person acted.
This defense was successfully raised by defendants in Interamerican
Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc. 67 Plaintiff Interamerican
charged that it was unable to obtain Venezuelan crude oil necessary
for its refinery in New Jersey because of defendants suppliers' re-
fusal to deal with it. Summary judgment was granted to the defen-
dant suppliers, however, because the Venezuelan government had
forbidden sales of its oil which would reach Interamerican, directly
or indirectly. By its ruling the court carried the "scant authority" of
the dicta in Continental Ore and Swiss Watchmakers, as to when
compulsion is a defense, one step farther, referring to the "antitrust
exception" in the case of acts of a foreign sovereign in its own
jurisdiction. The court reasoned that sovereignty includes the right
to regulate commerce within the nation and stated:
When a nation compels a trade practice, firms there have
no choice but to obey. Acts of business become effectively
acts of the sovereign. The Sherman Act does not confer
jurisdiction on United States courts over acts of foreign
66 The complaint was dismissed as against one of the American corporations on technical
grounds, and as against one of the Swiss defendants found not to have been a signatory, but
the court found that the other defendants had restrained United States foreign and domestic
trade as to watches and watch parts in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 73 of the
Wilson Tariff Act. 1963 Trade Cas. at 77,452.
67 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
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sovereigns. By its terms, it forbids only anticompetitive
practices of persons and corporations. 68
The court denied plaintiff's request to conduct an inquiry into the
validity of the Venezuelan laws. For the court to rule on the validity
of foreign laiks would be interference in a matter of foreign policy, a
political question, outside the province of the court. 69
Some 60 years after the decison in American Banana refusing to
question the act of a Central American sovereign—and a continent
away, with the scene laid in the Persian Gulf—the District Court for
the Central District of California, in Occidental Petroleum Corp. v.
Buttes Gas & Oil Co.," refused to question the sovereign acts of
three foreign powers—the ruler of the Trucial State, Sharjah; Great
Britain, acting through its Foreign Office; and the Government of
Iran, acting through its National Iranian Oil Company—and ruled
for the defendant in a private treble damage suit for $1,000,000
brought by plaintiffs, Occidental Petroleum Corp. and its wholly
owned subsidiary Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn (Occidental),
concessionaire of the ruler of Umm al Qaywayn, against the conces-
sionaires of the ruler of Sharjah, Clayco Petroleum Co. (Clayco) and
Buttes Gas & Oil Co. (Buttes) and its officers, Boreta and Smith.
In this case, plaintiff Occidental Petroleum alleged that defen-
dant had stimulated a border dispute between those Persian Gulf
states in order to displace plaintiff from its oil concession. The
dismissal by the court was based on the act of state doctrine. 71 The
facts were •found to be "strikingly similar" to those of American
Banana. The court stated that it is clearly established that the
holding of American Banana that has endured is that the act of state
doctrine bars a claim for antitrust injury flowing from foreign
sovereign acts allegedly induced and procured by the defendant. In
a footnote, the court observed that although there had been acts or
alleged acts of sovereigns in both Sisal and Continental, those cases
"based liability on market conduct in the context of governmental
permission [whereas in Occidental] the conspiracy . . pleaded is
made up exclusively of the inducement of sovereign acts." 72 This
68 Id. at 1298. For a discussion of the implications of this case, see Note, 69 Mich. L.
Rev. 888 (1971).
69 307 F. Supp. at 1298. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 3 98 ,
430-32 (1964).
76 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff 'd, 461 F,2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 950 (1972).
71 331 F. Supp. at 113. The court remarked that ". . . inquiries by this court into the
authenticity and motivation of threats of foreign sovereigns would be the very sources of
diplomatic friction and complication that the act of state doctrine aims to avert." Id.
72 Id. at 109-10 n,28.
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observation makes it plain that even in cases where acts of
sovereigns are concerned, the line is very sharply drawn.
V. REMEDIAL RELIEF FOR EXTRATERRITORIAL
SHERMAN ACT VIOLATIONS
In fashioning a remedial decree in an extraterritorial antitrust
case, a court must consider 'many of the same factors of international
law, comity among nations and economic policy as are necessary for
determination of whether acts of a foreign sovereign were involved
in such a manner as to put the case beyond the reach of the antitrust
laws in the first place. The court is put in a position in which it must
order remedial steps to be taken by a foreign person or corporation.
The foreign defendant may become entangled with the law of its
own nation in trying to obey the American court.
In United States v. General Electric Co.," personal jurisdiction
over the alien corporation, N.V. Philips' Gloeilampenfabrieken, had
been obtained by service on its officers, who had taken refuge in the
United States to escape the Nazis. The court had filed its opinion in
1949. In 1953, when the court framed the judgment to implement
the decree, it took into account the special situation of the alien
defendant, by excepting Philips from certain of the provisions ap-
plicable to the other defendants, which would "expose its European
business to ruptures not necessary or required for the relief sought in
this action. "74
Nevertheless, Philips was held to many of the remedial provi-
sions. It was enjoined from contracting with any co-defendant or
any other United States manufacturer of lamps, lamp parts or
machinery in any manner which would require Philips to participate
in a plan limiting importation or exportation of such goods to or
from the United States. 75
Each defendant, including Philips, was ordered to dedicate its
existing lamp and lamp part patents to the public, thus compelling
completely royalty free use of the patents. The court justified this
harsh measure on the ground that licensing fees would inhibit com-
petition because of the narrow profit margin on the production of
lamps. It also stated that in view of the fact that General Electric
had achieved and maintained its dominant position in the industry
largely through patent control, the requirement that it contribute its
existing patents to the public was a justifiable dilution of that
control bringing about greater competition in the industry. 76
73
 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949), discussed in text at notes 45-47 supra.
74
 115 F. Supp. 835, 856 (D.N.J. 1953).
75
 Id. at 842.
76 Id. at 843ff.
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Philips objected to its inclusion in the dedication requirement,
contending that it was only peripherally associated with the con-
spiracy. It argued that binding it to this requirement constituted an
attempt by the court "to regulate the economic policies of foreign
nations where conduct proscribed by the antitrust laws is perfectly
legal."" The court disagreed, stating that it could and should re-
quire Philips to dedicate its American patents in order to remedy
that company's violations of the antitrust laws. Requiring Philips to
comply with this order would not ensnarl Philips with foreign
courts, because only American patents were subject to the dedica-
tion requirement."
The decree also required defendants to grant immunity from
suit to any patent licensee who might elect to have lamp machinery
manufactured for it by a foreign manufacturer." Philips objected to
being compelled to place itself in the complicated situation of being
required to grant immunity from suit on its foreign patents which
might arise in foreign courts. 8° The court relieved Philips from the
immunity-from-suit provision of the decree, stating that the dedica-
tion of its American patents was sufficient remedy for Philips' ac-
tions in suppression of trade." In one of the saving clauses in the
decree the court stated:
Philips shall not be in contempt of this judgment for doing
anything outside of the United States which is required or
for not doing anything outside of the United States which
is unlawful under the laws of the government, province,
country or state in which Philips or any other subsidiaries
may be incorporated, chartered or organized or in the
territory of which Philips or any such subsidiaries may be
doing business."
The exemption of Philips from the immunity-from-suit provision is
indicative of the court's desire to avoid interfering with foreign
litigation. 83 This problem did not arise in applying the dedication-of-
patent order to Philips, because American patents are entirely
within the court's jurisdiction.
Another case in which the court showed an awareness of the
77
 Id. at 846.
78 Id.
79
 Id. at 851.
88 Id.
8 I Id.
82 Id. at 878.
83
 This provision was deemed warranted by the court "as a safeguard to its [Philips']
protection from being caught between the jaws of this judgment and the operation of laws in
foreign countries where it does its business." Id.
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limitations on the remedies that can be effectively provided when
aliens are involved is United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries,
Ltd." Imperial Chemical (ICI), a British corporation, and several
American corporations (including E.I. duPont) were charged with
'joining in agreements dividing up world markets in the chemical
trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act." Several foreign
corporations not named as defendants were alleged to have been
parties to some of these agreements. In 1939, under one of these
agreements, duPont granted an exclusive license to its British nylon
patents to ICI, with the right to grant sub-licenses. In 1947, ICI
sublicensed British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. (BNS) to manufacture
nylon yarn. BNS, a British corporation, was a non-party in the
suit in question. The effect of these licensing agreements was to keep
the patented products manufactured in the United States by duPont
out of the British market, and to keep the British products out of
the United States. Two years after the commencement of the anti-
trust suit in 1944, the duPont-ICI licensing agreement was cancelled
and duPont assigned its British patents to ICI. In March 1947, ICI
granted BNS exclusive licences under the assigned patents. The
court found a violation of the Sherman Act."
The court decree ordered the compulsory licensing of all the
United States patents involved in the conspiracy. This licensing
order was not imposed on ICI's British patents." However, the
court ordered that ICI grant immunity under its foreign patents,
despite the fact that ICI had introduced at trial testimony of an
expert on British law to the effect that a provision for granting
immunities is contrary to British public policy and that the British
courts would not enforce such a provision contained in the judgment
of a court of a foreign jurisdiction."
The court expressly recognized there might be difficulty in
enforcing this order, since it dealt with regulation of patent rights
granted by a foreign corporation. However, the court thought that
the in personam jurisdiction it had over ICI was sufficient basis for
the order. It hoped the British courts would honor its decision as a
matter of comity. "[T]he effectiveness of [our decree] depends upon
the recognition which will be given to our judgment as a matter of
comity by the courts of the foreign sovereign which has granted the
patents in question.""
" 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y.), enforcing 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
18
 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). See 100 F. Supp. at 509.
85
 100 F. Supp. at 594.
87
 The Government had not asked that ICI be directed to grant compulsory licenses to its
British patents, thus indicating an awareness that there was an issue of limitation of remedies.
" 105 F. Supp. at 228.
89
 Id. at 229.
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A further weakness in the decree was that it ordered ICI not to
assert its British patent to prevent the importation of nylon polymer
and yarn from the United States into Great Britain. BNS, which
was not a defendant, had acquired some of these patent rights from
ICI. The court stated that BNS was aware of the nature of the
conspiracy and knowingly took advantage of the circumstances. The
court said it would not limit the scope of what it thought was a
proper decree "because of the possibility that the English courts"
would not give effect to it." The court did not have long to await
the anticipated reaction in England. In 1952, in British Nylon
Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd.," BNS sued
ICI for specific performance of the 1947 ICI-BNS agreement in
which ICI promised to grant BNS exclusive licenses under all the
patent rights which ICI acquired from duPont in certain designated
territories. The English court denied that comity required recogni-
tion of the American court's decree. It enjoined by interlocutory
decree the divestiture pursuant to the American decree by ICI of any
of the patent rights it had obtained from duPont in 1946 until final
judgment was reached in the English specific performance case. 92
The English court disagreed with the statement in the Ameri-
can decision that "[ijt is not an intrusion on the authority of a foreign
sovereign for this court to direct that steps be taken to remove the
harmful effects on the trade of the United States." 93 BNS had
acquired enforceable rights to the patent licences in its 1947 contract
with ICI, and these rights were "English in character." The Ameri-
can courts were not competent to interfere with these rights. The
English courts have a duty to protect these patent rights." In 1954,
specific performance of the contract between BNS and ICI was
granted. 95 The court noted that BNS had not been a party before
the American court.
Despite the British court's decision denying effect to the Ameri-
can decree in the ICI case, the Supreme Court, in United States v.
Holophane Co., 96 affirmed, a few years later, a lower court decision
ordering Holophane Co., an American corporation, to compete in
9(1 Id. at 231.
91 [1952] 2 All E.R. 780 (C.A.).
91 Id. at 781.
93
 Id. at 782.
94 Id. at 783.
95
 British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., [1954) 3 All E.R.
88 (Ch.).
96
 352 U.S. 903 (1965), affg per curiam 119 F. Supp. 114 (S.D. Ohio 1954). For a
discussion of the conflicts between different sovereign states which decisions such as
Holophane tend to perpetuate and increase, see Oliver, Extraterritorial Application of United
States Legislation Against Restrictive or Unfair Trade Practices, 51 Am, j. Int'l L. 380,
382-85 (1957).
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foreign markets including even the territories where it had entered
into noncompetition agreements with foreign co-conspirator corpora-
tions. The decree did, however, provide that this should not be
construed as requiring the exportation by the defendant of any
products which would violate valid foreign patent or trademark
rights of the co-conspirators. 97 By the use of such language, the
court manifested an awareness of the possibility that a foreign court
would not cooperate with its decree, as was the case in ICI.
Foreign policy considerations led an American court in 1965 to
modify an earlier decree 98
 which conceivably could have interfered
with a foreign sovereignty in United States v. Watchmakers of
Switzerland Information Center, Inc. 99 The defense of sovereign
immunity had been unsuccessfully raised by the defendants, the
court finding that the agreements had merely been permitted, and
not required, by Swiss law.
The court had retained jurisdiction of the case, as is the usual
practice, to enable the parties to apply for modification of any of the
provisions of the judgment. The defendants had indicated their
intention to appeal from this final judgment. However, the Gov-
ernment requested modification of the judgment which would satisfy
the defendants. Among the grounds for the modification was the fact
that the Department of State had indicated to the Department of
Justice that a resolution of this litigation, "on a basis consistent with
United States antitrust laws, . . . would be advantageous from the
standpoint of American foreign policy."'" The court, in referring to
ICI and BNS, stated:
[T]hese modifications will prevent any situation from aris-
ing such as has occurred in other litigation in the past
when there was believed to be a possible conflict between a
decree of a United States court and the sovereignty of a
foreign nation. In the main the modifications relate to
peripheral areas of the judgment which might have been
construed to have bearing upon the sovereignty of the
Swiss Confederation.m
This type of international contretemps, sprinkled as it is on each
side with expressions of understanding for the problems of the other,
and for a corporation "caught between the jaws" of the judgment of
97 1954 Trade Cas. 67,679, at 69,183 (S.D. Ohio), enforcing 119 F. Supp. 114 (S.D.
Ohio 1954).
98 See 1963 Trade Cas, ¶ 70,600, at 77,414 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), discussed in text at notes
65-66 supra.
99 1965 Trade Cas. ¶ 71,352, at 80,490 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
100 1965 Trade Cas. at 80,492.
'°' Id. at 80,493.
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the courts of one country and the operations of laws in foreign
countries where it does its business, prompted Beausang to call for a
"national antitrust policy defining the proper exercise of jurisdiction"
which, as we have seen, is practically unlimited in its worldwide
scope. Finding no quarrel with the apparent lack of limitation upon
the existence of jurisdiction, the author declared, however, that
policy heretofore only considered by courts when forming decrees,
"must guide the Justice Department in its decision whether to bring
an action and the courts when an action is filed." 1 D 2 He concluded
that the burden seems to be on Congress to adopt a frame of
reference.
The 1955 Report of the Attorney General's National Committee
to Study the Antitrust Laws appears to take the view that the
problem is capable of resolution without new legislation, and that it
may be left to the sound discretion of the courts. "[W]e must as-
sume, as Alcoa suggests, that Congress did not intend the 'general
words' of the Sherman Act to be read 'without regard to the limita-
tions customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of their
powers.' " 103
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion has been confined principally to cases
which have arisen under the Sherman Act, or the Sherman Act in
combination with the Wilson Tariff Act of 1894, as amended, be-
cause the leading cases in the foreign trade and commerce field have
arisen under those acts.'" It is these decisions which have carved
102 Beausang, The Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the Sherman Act, 70 Dick, L. Rev.
187, 197 (1966).
103 Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws
76-77 (1955).
1G4 The fact that there has not been more litigation in the foreign trade and commerce
area under the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970), is understandable. The Clayton Act
applies to "commerce among the several states and with foreign nations," 15 U.S.C. 5 12
(1970), but the language of the various substantive provisions is not so broadly phrased as that
of the jurisdictional provision, For example, in order for § 7 which encompasses corporate
mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures to be applied, there must exist a probable effect of
substantially lessening competition or tending to create a monopoly in the United States. 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
For discussions of this subject, see Graham, Herman & Marcus, Section 7 of the Clayton
Act and Mergers Involving Foreign Interests, 23 Stan, L. Rev. 205 (1971); Scott & Yablonski,
Transnationul Mergers and Joint Ventures Affecting American Exports, 14 Antitrust Bull. 1,
11-16 (1968).
There has likewise been only limited litigation in the foreign area under the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1970) (FTC Act), which prohibits quinfair
methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce."
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970). "Commerce" is defined to include "commerce among the several
States or with foreign nations." 15 U.S.C. § 44 (1970).
For a well-known case concerning the extraterritorial application of the FTC Act, see
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out a body of law which defines the reach of the Sherman Act with a
degree of certainty, at least as to the types of circumstances under
which the Act may apply. The area of less certainty is the more
practical one, of the extent to which our court decrees should at-
tempt to order acts done abroad, and the extent to which such
orders will or can be enforced.
Changes in world trade conditions, bringing on an increase in
tariffs and quota restrictions, could finally make competition impos-
sible and bring about the situation envisaged by the court in United
States v., Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co.,'° 5 making it
impossible to export to a particular country or area at a profit so that
there would be no American foreign commerce in such area which
could be restrained or monopolized.
Crises in international trade can give birth to unexpected mea-
sures involving the United States Government in business arrange-
ments which in more settled conditions would never have been
suggested. Such measures can in turn influence antitrust enforce-
ment. Unsettled world conditions have even led the United States
Government to take steps which have been challenged in court as an
unconstitutional attempt to exempt from the antitrust laws the Vol-
untary Restraint Arrangements on Steel, in the negotiation of which
the United States Department of State played an active role.'" The
question of a violation of the Sherman Act was not before the court.
Commentators have, however, expressed the view that our antitrust
laws apply to this type of restrictive agreement. 107 The fact that
such steps are taken is an indication of how international economics
could influence enforcement decisions and types of defenses prof-
fered in antitrust suits with international aspects. The Arrangements
on Steel led one commentator to remark that "Mlle role played by
the Department of State may well, as a practical matter, preclude
U.S. Government action against the foreign steelmakers." 1 °8 He
did, on the other hand, envisage a possible treble damage suit
Branch v. FTC, 141 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944). See also Ward, The Federal Trade Commission
and Unfair Methods of Competition in Foreign Commerce, 40 ABA Antitrust L.]. 806, 809
(1971), predicting that "routine Commission fact-gathering activities and other enforcement-
related programs involving foreign trade will expand and change, as foreign commerce has
developed."
'°5 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
ioa Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319, 1323-24 (D.D.C.
1973). The court there stated that the executive has no authority under the Constitution or
acts of Congress to exempt the Voluntary Restraint Arrangements on Steel from the antitrust
laws, and that such arrangements are not exempt. Since the question of whether or not a
violation of the Sherman Act was present was not before the court, the parties were urged to
re-examine their positions in light of the court's memorandum.
107 Maw, United States Antitrust Law Abroad—The Enduring Problem of Extraterrito-
riality, 40 ABA Antitrust L.J. 796, 801-05 (1971).
in Id. at 801.
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against the foreign steelmakers by an American purchaser of foreign
steel whose supply of cheaper foreign steel was cut because of export
limitations, and posed the question: "[Ad]ust the sponsorship giving
rise to the defense [of Act of State] be that of the U.S. Department of
State rather than that of a foreign government as in Swiss
Watch?" 1"
1439 Id.
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